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This paper examines the need for tactically responsive space systems capable of
supporting battlefield and fleet commanders.
Terminology used to describe this category
of satellite system varies according to
organization or agency.
The Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency's
Lightsat, the Naval Space Command's SPI/>.fSAT, and the Air Force Space Command s
TACSAT, are reviewed. The Unite~ ~tat~s
Space Command's space support mISSIOn IS
addressed and the role single-purpose
satellites can play in fUlfilling requirements
for operationally responsive satellite systems
is described. The United States and Department of Defense space policies are
discussed. The position taken by Secretary
of Defense, Frank Carlucci reg.ardin,g
CHEAPSATS is discussed. The relatzonshlp
between multi-mission and single-purpose
satellite systems is delineated, in addition to
fulfilling specific mission requirements,
single-purpose satellite systems can augment
multi-mission systems in crisis or fill temporary outages. Candidate functions for single-purpose satellites which include: communications, surveillance, meteorology, and
store and forward (to readout remote
sensors or transfer data to forward users)
are discussed.
This paper identifies major factors
which have contributed to the high cost of
today's satellite systems and suggests:
1) modifying or eliminating milit~ry sta~
dards which are no longer applIcable m
light of today's modern highly reliable

technology; 2) eliminating the req'!irement
for redundant systems where operatIOnal r:equirements clearly do not warrant them (I.e.
a tactical system required to support a battlefield commander for six months ~es not
require redundant systems to. pr:o.V1de three
year life expectancy); 3) maxlm~zmg the use
of commercial-off-the-shelf equipment; and
4) adapting best commercia,l practices during dev~lopment. 1 n~~ p~llosop~y regar~
ing testmg and rell.abillty IS provl~ed. Th,s
philosophy is reqwred to make smgle-purpose satellite systems cost effective.
Reducing the production costs of singlepurpose satellite systems will not guarantee
an inexpensive system since launch costs
constitute a major portion of a system's
overall cost. The smallest launch vehicle
available today is the 1950's technology
Scout, with a launch cost of approximately
$10 million. New launch technology such
as that used in the Pegasus launch system
can reduce burdensome launch costs. The
current
vertical
launch
integration
philosophy and capabilities are not responsive
to
operational
requirements.
Horizontal launch integration methods and
new launch systems derived from commercial ventures have the potential to make
space systems more responsive to tactical
commanders as well as decreasing total system cost.
A systems approach to .meeting
operational requirements should be mco.rporated into architectures and operatzonal
concepts. This approach would tak~ adva',ltage of symbiotic relationships whIch eXIst
between today's systems and future singlepurpose systems. Planning should emphasize the day-to-day use of a set of t~ese
single-purpose systems to ensure operational personnel are proficien,t. Single-purpose
satellites have the potentIal to profoundly
impact the use of space systems by tactical
commanders in the theater environment.

I
are gaining in popUlarity and may become
the systems of the future. The Wall Street
Journal carried an article in their February 9,
1989 issue which discussed activities in the
small satellite area.
One of the more
noteworthy items in the article was a
reference to Senator Robert Byrd's (D
W.VA) space symposium held in January of
this year. Senator Byrd sees small satellite
development as a "hot new industry essential
to national security and international
competition... 4

SINGLE PURPOSE SATELLITE
SYSTEMS
by
Warren S. Watkins/ CTA
INCORPORATED
INTRODUCTION
Within the last two years, there has been
a resurgence of interest in Single Purpose
Inexpensive Satellite Systems (SPINSATS),
reference the recent compromise between
DARPA and the Air Force regarding
D ARPA's Lightsat program which calls for
DARPA to down play work on launchers
and concentrate on low-cost satellite
technology. DARPA is pursuing Lightsat
Research and Development (R&D), an area
previously dominated by the Air Force l .
Organizations/agencies
have
different
terminology for small satellite systems.
The Navy uses the term SPINSAT2, the
Defense Advanced Research Projects
Agency (DARPA) refers to this class of
satellites as Lightsats, recently the Air Force
Space Command (AFSPACECOM) has
begun to define this class of satellites as
Tactical Satellites (TACSATS), another term
which has been used is CHEAPSAT. The
former Secretary of the Air Force Edward C.
Aldridge Jr. was of the opinion that cheap
satellites could not be built to perform the
missions of todays large multi-mission space
vehicles3• Today's technology does not
allow all the functions of large satellites to
be packaged into a small satellite. However,
there are several reasons why small satellites

The 1987 revision to the 1982 DoD
Space Policy recognized that space was a
medium just like land, sea, and air in which
military operations may be conducted for
force enhancement and force application.
Control of space is a vital element of the
new space policy. Control of space means
the freedom to operate systems in space and
the capability to deny an adversary the
ability to operate in space when the need
arises.
To the average field commander,
satellites tend to be viewed as fragile, nonsurvivable, non-responsive, temperamental
systems which cannot be relied upon in time
of conflict Proliferation of satellites is a
method of increasing survivability and
adding robustness to a space system. The
cost of todays satellites make proliferation
highly unlikely, although the Global
Positioning System (GPS) does rely on a
proliferated constellation of 24 satellites to
achieve robustness at a cost of several billion
dollars.
GPS fulfills responsiveness
requirements by having a large number of
satellites in orbit.
An alternative to
maintaining a large number of satellites in
orbit to meet responsiveness requirements is
to have a responsive launch capability and
spacecraft available for launch.

1. "DARPA Buys Lightsat Launcher", MILITARY
SPACE, Pasha Publications, 24 April, 1989,
pp.3.

2. The tenn SPINS AT has been used by Dr.
William E. Howard, III, Director of Technology,
Naval Space Command, for several years. Dr.
Howard is the flrst person I know to have used
the tenn.

Space systems have been supporting the
military warfighting commanders for many
years. Only recently have these warfighting
commanders been made aware of the

3. Edward C. Aldridge Jr., "Consistency",

4. Bob Davis, "Fleet of Big Defense Satellites May
Be Future Pearl Harbor Awaiting a Dec 7," Wall

DEFENSE 88. November/December, 88 issue,
pp.14.

Street Journal. 9 Feb. 1989, pp. 14
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capability which could be provided to them.
In the past, the battlefield commander has
taken what information has been provided to
him and made the most of it. Today those
same battlefield commanders are asking for
organic space resources. Additionally they
want those space resources to be responsive
to their needs. Small satellite systems have
the potential to fulfill the growing
requirement for responsive, organic space
assets [organic in the sense that the space
system appears to be dedicated to the
commander while the satellite is over his
Area of Responsibility (AOR)].

responsive space assets. A fundamental
question which must be answered is how
long does the battlefield commander require
or expect an organic space asset to survive
or last in a conflict situation. The most
popular answer would probably be, "as long
as it is up there". There are tradeoffs which
must be made regarding life expectancy,
power requirements, sensing resolution, data
rates, coverage, refresh period, etc. These
tradeoffs will ultimately effect things such as
satellite size, weight, and orbital parameters
(altitude, inclination, eccentricity), and
launch requirements.

Current technology makes it possible to
package a single function into a relatively
small mass. New technology developments
in charged coupled devices (CCD) , mosaic
sensor arrays for different spectrums, compact high speed computers for on board sensor processing, more efficient power generation capabilities, and image compression
techniq ues to decrease the data rates on existing communications links will allow small
single purpose satellites to be produced with
off the shelf technology/equipment. Mobile
ground terminals consisting of powerful,
compact computer systems capable of providing satellite commanding and mission
data processing can be developed using existing technology to support the small satellites of the future. These systems could be
deployed to theater level commanders.

The combination of requirements
defmition, technology advancements, and
innovative launch capabilities can make
small satellite systems affordable from a
systems perspective.
The roll of small satellite systems and
multi-mission spacecraft must be well
defmed and orchestrated to prevent
polarizing the large satellite community
against small satellites. Furthermore, a
coordinated architecture must be developed
and agreed upon to gain funding support for
small satellite systems.
Do these arguments support pursuing the
development of single purpose satellites, and
are these systems affordable under todays
acquisition methods?

Launching space assets has been an
expensive proposition in the past, new innovative methods of achieving orbit will
change this.
The requirements of the
battlefield commander has not been a
driving factor in our launch strategy. This is
changing, the USSPACECOM is conducting
an Assured Mission Space Support
Architecture Study (AMSSAS). This study
will define the requirements of the
battlefield commanders. It is expected that
these requirements will lead to a responsive
launch strategy and resulting launch assets.
Achieving this launch strategy will make
launch on demand a reality.

DOD SPACE POLICY
The United States Space Command
(USSPACECOM) was established in 1985.
Shortly after its creation, the other Unified
and Specified Commanders and their staffs
were briefed on the mission of the new
command. Space Control was likened to
Sea Control in the first USSPACECOM
mission briefing presented worldwide in
19855• This same comparison was made by
Secretary of Defense Frank C. Carlucci in
his discussion of the the 1987 000 space
policy in the NovemberlDecember issue of

The operational community has begun to
develop operational requirements and
concepts for the employment of tactically

5. Warren Watkins, Roles and Missions of the United States Space Command, USSPACECOM
Briefmg, (Spring 1985, Colorado Springs, Co.

3

Defense 88. Secretary Carlucci further
stated in his Defense 88 article that to
effectively
control
space
we
must.. ....."Develop, operate and maintain an
assured mission capability through an
appropriate mix of robust satellite control,
assured access to space, survivability, onorbit sparing, proliferation, reconstitution or
other means." The terms assured access to
space, proliferation, and reconstitution are
areas where small satellite systems can make
major contributions. The national space
policy released in 1988 concurs with the
DoD space policy of 1987 and differentiates
between civil and national security areas and
commercial areas.

cost to almost 1/2 billion dollars6• Clearly
this was not a tactically responsive launch,
but that is what the war ftghting
commanders are asking for today. They
want systems which they can count upon,
they do not want their requirements placed
in a queue and fulftlled provided they are not
out-prioritized. They want systems which
are "chopped" to them in a crisis. They also
want to train with the systems during
exercises so they can be assured their men
can operate the system.

Just as sea control is vital to a nation's
ability to pursue its economic objectives
during peace and its military objectives
during conflict; space control also assures a
nation the ability to pursue its economic
objectives in space during peace and its
military objectives during conflict. The
commercialization of space will take on new
meaning in the next two decades as man
begins to live and manufacture goods in
space.
The use of satellites for
communications, meteorology, and warning
has already become vital to our national
survivaL In the very near future space based
navigation will become the sole means of
navigation for not only the United States but
for many of our allies as the Global
Positioning
System
(GPS)
becomes
operationaL
Space based systems for
detailed earth sensing and astronomy will
become routine. As dependence on satellites
increases, the need for assured access to
space becomes critical. June 14, 1989 was a
historic day, it marked the ftrst launch of a
Titan 4 launch vehicle, an event which was
suppose to compensate for the loss of the
Challenger three years earlier. A close
examination of this launch reveals that space
launch is not a common occurrence as some
would have us believe. The Titan 4 was
moved to the launch pad on May 15, 1988, a
year prior to the actual launch. The cost of
the Titan 4 launch vehicle was estimated at
$220 million,. the upper stage was $45
million, and the satellite launched was
estimated at $187 million, bringing the total

The warfighting commanders have been
using space assets for a number of years,
systems such as the Defense Satellite
Communications
System
(DSCS),
FLEETS AT, and AFSATCOM have been
providing communications to wamghters for
years. The Defense Meteorological Satellite
Program (DMSP) has been providing
strategic and tactical weather data for over
15 years. Transit has provided navigation
data for the majority of the maritime fleet as
well as Naval vessels for over 20 years.
There are other systems which provide
information, although not directly, to fteld
forces. The operational forces are becoming
aware of their increasing dependence on
space systems and want to participate in the
design of upgrades and new systems. The
USSPACECOM has begun an Assured
Mission Space Support Architecture Study
(AMSSAS) and have been meeting with
representatives from the unifIed and
specifted commands to determine their
requirements.
It is expected that the
AMSSAS will also dictate launch
responsiveness requirements based on
operational needs.

SPACE SUPPORT TO WARFIGHTING
COMMANDERS

One of the common requirements I
remember hearing when I visited the unifted
and specifted commands as a representative
of the newly formed USSPACECOM was
that the fteld commanders wanted organic
6. "Costly new Titan 4 Rocket Carries instant-alert
satellite into space,"Gazette Telegraph, 15 June.
1989, p. AS, colsl-3.
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If this "off the shelf' approach is used to
develop small satellite systems, a great deal
can be saved in research and development
time and costs; additionally, more reliable
systems can be produced which will lead to
greater acceptance by the operational
community.

space assets. They did not want to put their
requirements into a queue only to be out
prioritized by another user. I attempted to
point out why this was not realistic since
satellites provide global support and it did
not make any sense to give the Commanderin-Chief Europe (CINCEUR) total control
over assets which could support CINC
Pacific (CINCPAC) 45 minutes after the
satellite left CINCEUR's AOR. The bottom
line is that the CINC's want space assets
"chopped" (assigned) to them during conflict
in the same manner fighter wings, fleets,
and armor battalions are"chopped."

Technology continues to evolve at an
ever increasing rate. Charged-Coupled
Devices (CCDs) will enable the creation of
sensing arrays in multi-spectral bands, Very
High Speed Integrated Circuit (VHSIC), and
Very Large Scale Integrated Circuit
(VLSIC) will provide the capability to place
a greater number of components on the chips
of tomorrow. This will result in greater
capabilities at reduced weight and power.
As sensing capability increases, so does the
space to ground data throughput. With
todays technology, the transmission of large
quantities of data to the ground requires
broad bandwidths and high power to close
the link with the ground stations these two
factors are not compatible with small satellite systems. Image compression techniques
have been developed which reduce the
quantity of data required to be transmitted to
the ground.
As satellite on-board
capabilities increase, data can be processed
on the satellite before transmission to the
ground. This will further reduce the downlink bandwidth required and permit users to
receive only that data which concerns them.

Another common comment I heard
when touring the unified and specified
commands was "if I don't use it every day, I
won't use it in combat," meaning the
battlefield commanders want their personnel
to operate space assets day-to-day.
Familiarity with the systems upon which
they rely will preclude harried reference to
complicated technical orders during a crisis
to understand how to use those systems.
These operational personnel also want to use
"their" space systems during exercises.
This does not infer that tactical commanders
should be given launch vehicles and a supply
of satellites to be launched as they deem
necessary.
This topic will be further
developed in the section on operational
concepts.
These operational requirements can be
fulfilled through the use of single-purpose
inexpensive satellites which are responsive
to tactical commanders.

Small space-rated GPS receivers will
enable a satellite to determine its ephemeris
throughout its orbit. This infonnation will
be transmitted to users so they can calculate
their next contact with the satellite. This
will eliminate the requirement to forward
satellite ephemeris to forward users. The
ephemeris generated will be more accurate
than what is created today through the
USSPACECOM satellite tracking network
since data will be gathered throughout the
entire orbit instead of from fixed tracking
stations located in the northern hemisphere.

DEVELOPMENTS IN TECHNOLOGY
George C. Larson states in an editorial
in the June/July 1989 Air & Space, "The
achievement of that goal ( referring to the
Apollo lunar program) did not create vast
new technologies. To an overwhelming degree, as the stories by Kenneth F. Weaver
and T.A. Heppenheimer point out, the
Apollo program took what was on the shelf,
then developed and refined it. There was no
other way to build vehicles that would be so
reliable as to approach perfection. Wholesale inventions are almost never reliable. "

DARPA has solicited proposals for
Lightsat technology through a Broad Agency
Announcement (BAA); The Office of Naval
Research has put out a BAA for SPINSAT
technology; AFSP ACE COM is developing a

5

Statement of need for a tactical satellite
system (TACSAT); the Air Force Systems
Command Space System Division\ (SSD) is
in the process of issuing a Program Research
and Development Announcement (PRDA)
for new, innovative, and affordable concepts
and approaches to satisfy the tactical
commander's
dedicated intra-theater
communications needs; SSD has issued a
BAA for an Advanced Space Technology
Program (ASTP), small satellite platfonns
capable of carrying a series of specific
experiments into space.

All of the programs identified in the
preceding paragraph will contribute to the
development of small tactical satellite
systems.
DEVELOPMENTS IN LAUNCH
Since the Challenger accident there has
been renewed interest in expendable launch
vehicles. The national space policy has
encouraged commercialization of launch
systems. One of the innovative concepts
which DARPA is pursuing is Pegasus, an air
launch vehicle with significant capabilities
especially, in the small satellites arena.
Pegasus has the potential to fulfill
responsive rapid launch requirements for
satellites in the 400 pound range.
At
approximately $6 million dollars per launch.
this concept is significantly cheaper than any
existing launch system, (approximate costs
of existing systems are: Scout: $10 million;
Delta: $45 million; and Titan ITI: $100
million) 8. NASA is involved in a Standard
Small Launch Vehicle (SSLV) program
which has the potential to lower the cost of
placing satellites in orbit.

Recently the Strategic Defense Initiative
Office (SDIO) announced breakthroughs in
the miniaturization of parts for hightechnology weapons known as "Brilliant
Pebbles". A research and development
vehicle was flown for a short duration by
scientists at the Lawrence Livennore
National Laboratory.
These "Brilliant
Pebbles" are approximately three feet long,
one foot in diameter, and weigh "" 100
pounds. Smaller vehicles, weighting as little
as 10 pounds, are envisioned for the future
as the size of a Cray computer is reduced to
the size of a deck of cards. The system of
the future will employ fiber optics. chargedcoupled devices in curved focal planes to
provide the high resolution required to detect
reentry vehicles over a wide field of view,
and on-board super-computers to process the
data.
Operational concepts call for
deployment of thousands of these small
satellites.
"Brilliant Pebbles" could be
deployed within five years. according to the
SDIO office7•
The technology being
developed for SDI will have spinoffs The
advanced sensor systems, computer systems,
and new advances in the construction of
small satellite vehicles will make other small
satellite systems a reality.

A major change is required in the
method that launch vehicles are prepared
and satellites integrated to the launch
vehicle. The United States assembles the
vast majority of its launch vehicle on the
launch pad, perfonns checks and tests, than
places the satellite on the launch vehicle and
perfonns integration tests and satellite
readiness checks. The exception to this vertical assembly is the Scout launch vehicle
which is assembled and integrated with the
payload horizontally than erected on the
launch pad and launched. Prior to launch a
system readiness test is perfonned on the
entire system. If a problem is discovered it
is fixed on the launch pad, or if the problem
is significant the satellite is de-mated and the
launch vehicle is taken apart until the
problem is identified and fixed. The launch
vehicle "stack" is then reassembled and tested again. This launch process is usually

The large quantities envisioned for SDI
could drive the costs down to where small
satellites are not only very capable but cost
competitive with other means of gathering
and/or distributing infonnation.

8. Joseph A. Harriss. "Get'em Up Seoul!" AIR &
SPACE Smithsonian. February/ March 1989, p.

7. William J. Broad, " 'Star Wars' weapons pared
down in size and price," Gazette Telegraph, 30
Apr. 1989, p. All. colsl-6.
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measured in months. If a launch failure
occurs, further launches are halted until the
cause is identified, a fix is made, and
responsible personnel are fired. Contrast
this with the launch methods of the Soviet
Union, who integrate their launch vehicles
horizontally in facilities adjacent to the
launch pad, and integrate the satellite while
the launch vehicle is still horizontal. Once
their checks are complete they move the
launch vehicle, with the satellite attached, to
the launch pad and erect the "stack" and
launch within hours or days. They have
demonstrated a robust launch capability by
launching several satellites from the same
pad in a single day. The Soviets do not
operate on 100 percent expected success.
They have experienced a launch failure and
launched another of the same kind of satellite within days.

Navy) have a cultural bias in that we tend to
trust the things we own and control
ourselves. If we don't feel we've got enough
control over [space assets], or worry that
they won't be there when we need them, we
won't place much dependence on them as we
otherwise would. "10
The Air Force conducted a Blue Ribbon
panel last fall which developed an
implementation plan to normalize space in
the Air Force. The plan covers doctrine,
strategy. force structure, organization, and
training. The panel recommended that the
Air Force remain the principal, but not the
exclusive, military space agency. 11
An operational concept which is supported by the Army and Navy would place
the space asset under the command of the
tactical commander so he could task the
asset directly. The Tracking, Telemetry, and
Commanding (IT&C) as well as anomaly
analysis and resolution would be the
responsibility of the Air Force Space
Command.
A nominal constellation of
satellites would be maintained in orbit to
allow field commanders to use the space
asset for training and during exercises. If a
conflict arose the tactical commander could
request additional space assets be launched
to fulfill his requirement.
This might
involve optimizing the constellation to meet
the field commander's specific requirements.

The Scout launch vehicle is assembled
and the satellite mated in the horizontal
poSItIOn.
The concept of horizontal
integration and mating of the satellite is not
new to our space business. This method has
been successfully used for Scout launch
vehicles for over fifteen years. Likewise, the
Pegasus launch vehicle will use horizontal
assembly and satellite integration.

OPERATIONAL REQUffiEMENTS
CONCEPTS

&

The National Academy of Sciences
recently concluded in a study known as the
"Navy 21 study, that space-based systems
will be a key factor in 21st century sea
engagements. "Future U.S. ships may carry
ASATs and lights at boosters. During a
conflict, the lightsat boosters would be
launched to augment or replace systems
destroyed by enemy ASATs. We need to
militarize our space assets, and that includes
spares, a panel member stated. The Navy
21 study addresses the need for tactically
responsive single purpose satellites to meet

The Army Space Institute at Ft
Leavenworth, KS is actively integrating
space into the battlefield.
They are
developing Army space doctrine and a
manual titled "Space SuPPort for Army
Operations This manual defines the use of
space-based
sensors in
support of
the"AirLand Battle" doctrine9 .

If

If.

Rear Adm. David Frost, Commander of
the Naval Space Command stated to
Aviation Week that the Navy views space
simply as an extension of what the Navy has
been doing for years, but from a higher
vantage point. He further stated, "we (the

If

10. Edward H. Kolcum, .. Military Services Assess
Optimum Use of Space in Era of Zero Budget
Growth," Aviation Week & Space Technology, 8
May 1989, p.87.

9. Anny doctrine calls for strike support" ,
MIliTARY SPACE, Pasha Publications Inc., 19
June, 1989, P. 1
If

11. Ibid
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the future requirements of ~e Navy.12

compatible with a fixed price contract. The
letter concludes with the following
statement: "I will not approve the agency's
(NASA) plans to proceed with the small
launch vehicle procurement without a clear
demonstration of effort to develop a
commercially reasonable approach. That
procurement should reflect radical changes
from the MELV RFP"14.

AFFORDABILITY
Small satellite systems will not become
a reality unless the total system costs can be
reduced to a level where the tactical forces
can use the systems on a day to day basis for
training, and commanders can request
launches in support of exercises to develop
familiarity with the systems in accordance
with new tactics and doctrine. There are
several methods of reducing costs, however
changes in development, acquisition, and
launch philosophy are required.

The National Space Policy of 1988
directs emphasis be placed on the
commercialization of space.
The
development of space-based sensing systems
are identified in a National Security
Decision Directive. This commercialization
will enhance the United States' ability to
maintain its place among world space
powers. It will also enhance competition for
launch services and spacecraft development
which will result in reduced costs. Reduced
launch and satellite development costs are
required to make small satellite systems a
reality within the next decade.

In a May 2, 1989 letter from Mr. Bob
Davis, president ofE'PRIME AEROSPACE
CORPORATION, to the Honorable Bill
Nelson,
Chairman
of
the
House
Subcommittee on Space Science and
Application regarding NASA's Request for
Proposal (RFP) for the Medium Expendable
Launch Vehicle (MELV), Mr. Davis states
that it will cost approximately $1.25 million
for the combined effort of E 'PRIME and all
their subcontractors to fully respond to the
MEL V RFP as it is currently written. Mr.
Davis further states that if E'PRIME treated
the RFP like any other commercial
procurement for a fixed price contract, it
would cost less than $100,000 to give the
technical and price proposals and an
implementation plan including schedule and
launch assurance plans 13.

A recent decision by the Navy to test
commercial computer technology in critical
military programs has led Unisys Corp. to
consider selling its $2 billion defense
business. According to the May 29, 1989
issue of Defense News, other diversified
companies are getting rid of their defense
operations, because of decreasing defense
budgets and the bureaucracy which must be
accommodated when doing business with
the government 1S . As stated earlier the cost
of meeting military standards can add up to
ten times the cost of doing business.
Accepting commercial off the shelf (COTS)
materials and best commercial practices for
testing can greatly reduce the cost of space
systems.

NASA's approach to doing "business as
usual" was criticized by Representative Bill
Nelson in a May 3, 1989 letter to Mr. Dale
D. Meyers, Acting NASA Administrator. In
the letter Representative Nelson encourages
NASA to unburden industry where possible
by departing from some of its traditional
procurement methods in areas where the
Federal Acquisition· Regulations authorize.
Examples cited were cost controls and
accounting procedures which are not

It is important to understand where MIL
standards originated and why they exist.
The early days of the U. S. space program

12. "Navy mulls place in space", MILITARY SPACE,
Pasha Publications, 19 June, 1989, p.3.

14. Bill Nelson, Rep CA, (Chairman, Subcommittee
on Space Science and Application) Letter to
Mr.Dale D. Meyers, Acting NASA
Administrator, May 3, 1989.

13. Bob Davis, "NASA's Medium Expendable
Launch Vehicle Request for Proposal ," Letter to
the Honorable Bill Nelson, May 2,1989.

15. S. Denny, "Unisys Reportedly Seeks to Discard
Defense Business," Defense News, 4, No. 22,
29 May 1989, p.27.
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were marked with numerous failures, launch
failures, failure to achieve desired orbit,
satellite infant mortality, power system
failures, attitude control failures, satellite
computer failures, and numerous others. In
an attempt to eliminate these failures
stringent standards were developed which
were intended minimize the occurrence of
previous failures.
When new failures
occurred new standards were developed to
preclude a reoccurrence. I have not known
of a single standard which has been deleted.
It is not unusual for proposals for space
systems to be several volumes and weigh
several hundred pounds.
The technical
volume for the space system may be page
limited, but the required documentation for
cost and other areas easily fill hundreds of
pages. In a recent article about the Wallops
Island Space Flight Facility, Larry J. Early
the chief of the projects division stated that
documentation for launch is virtually zero at
Wallops Island. This increases the level of
risk, however NASA is willing to accept the
risk because the launches are unmanned and
to minimize the chance of failure through
extensive testing and evaluation would be
very expensive. The approach is to fly more
missions instead of flying fail-safe 16• This
same approach could be used to decrease the
cost of small satellite systems.

tems have been developed to meet a broad
range of requirements from differing
organizations. The high cost of launching
space systems has contributed to the
philosophy of getting the most for launch
dollars, this has translated to placing more
sensors on satellite platforms, increasing the
utility of the systems by performing multiple
missions which satisfy the requirements of
many different users. This "fly one, satisfy
all approach is satisfactory provided the
users are not dependent upon time sensitive
information. For information to be of value
to the tactical commander, it must be
received in time to effect the deployment
and employment of the commanders forces
in a dynamic battle environment. In many
cases this would be in near real time. If the
tactical commanders cannot depend on the
availability of data from multi-mission
satellite systems, they will not use these
systems during conflict to achieve the force
multiplier effects possible, nor will they
employ the doctrine and tactics developed
around space based suppon systems.
Tactically responsive satellite systems which
appear to the tactical commander as organic
resources are possible using small single
purpose satellites, and new responsive
inexpensive launch systems.
fI

These small tactical satellite systems
would fulf111 the requirement of the tactical
commander for a responsive, organic,
reliable space asset. They would not be in
competition with multi-mission systems.
The tactical single purpose small satellite
system could fulfill multi-mission satellite
shortfalls resulting from on-orbit failures.
Therefore, the two systems should be viewed
as complementary systems, not competitive,
each fulfilling specific requirements and
providing a symbiotic relationship.

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SMALL
SATELLITES and MULTI-MISSION
SYSTEMS
There are large multi-mission satellite
systems which exist today that could provide
the tactical commander the data he requires
to effectively and efficiently deploy his forces to counter an adversary. These systems
are not dedicated to the tactical commander,
and while he may request suppon from
them, his request is placed in a queue along
with other requirements.
The tactical
commander usually does not have a high
enough priority to successfully compete with
other organizations and agencies, thus his requirement go unfulfilled. There is nothing
wrong with this system. Multi-mission sys-

SINGLE-PURPOSE SATELLITES
The vast majority of satellites in orbit
today are multi-purpose. As a result these
satellites tend to be large and expensive and
require large expensive launch vehicles
which take several months to prepare for
launch. The concept of a single purpose
satellite assumes that technology exists

16. Bed Brechner, "Space IsJand," AIR & SPACE
Smithsonian, April/May 1989, p. 65.
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which would enable the IDlsslon to be
perfonned by a small satellite. If the satellite
is small the launch vehicle could be small.
Thus the cost of the overall system would be
lower than current systems.
Potential
missions which could be accomplished by
small
satellite
systems
would be:
communications; surveillance (imaging and
electronic); meteorological; and store and
forward missions involving remote sensors.
As new technology evolves so will
additional missions.

easy task. Much of the technology is
developed for application outside the space
arena. Therefore, it is not space rated nor
does it meet MIL STDS or Mll... SPECS.
Hardware which falls in this category is
referred to as Commercial-Off-The-Shelf
(COTS). If COTS hardware were used to
build the tactical satellites described earlier
in this paper the cost could be reduced by at
least 10 times. This reduction in cost would
result from: 1) not having to maintain a
library of all applicable Mll... STDS; 2) not
having to test all materials and parts in
accordance with the appropriate MIL STD;
3) procuring material commercially; and 4)
developing alternatives to space rating requirements.

COST REDUCTION
A philosophical change is required in
the method we acquire our space systems.
The frrst thing which must be accomplished
is to analyze the requirements for the
system: How long must it operate? How
many are required (block buys can save
substantial amounts on the system buy)?
What response requirements have been
identified? Is a launch system available, or
will one have to be designed and procured?

Are volumes of Mll... STDS required to
build small single purpose satellites? If the
answer is yes, they will probably not be
inexpensive. To answer this. one must look
at how and why Mll... STDS were created.
The early days of the space program were
punctuated by numerous failures. These
ranged from launch failures to hard satellite
failures. When failures occurred, investigations were conducted to determine their
causes. In order to preclude a reoccurrence
of these failures, standards were developed
which tended to be applied to all space
programs. These standards continued to
grow in number and add to the large volume
of paperwork involved in producing a space
system. In an article on the Scout launch
vehicle Paul Goozh describes the problems
encountered in the early days of the Scout.
He states that after all the lessons were
learned,
standard operating procedures
filled "seven fat volumes. He further states
that after 25 years the procedures are
virtually the same.

How do we build small satellites cheaply? Highly complex electronic equipment is
being developed and produced today. This
equipment is highly reliable, due in many
cases to redundancy of high failure items. In
the computer industry this pro~ss; in
technology is evident. At the begiririifl,tof
1989 Apple offered memory upgrades for
Macintosh SE computers at a cost of $1200
per megabyte. In May. 1989, one megabyte
upgrades could be purchased for $181.00. In
June 1989, the cost of one megabyte
upgrades dropped to $131. By the end of
1989 the cost is expected to drop to $100.00
or less. These computer memory chips
come with a lifetime warrantee. This simple
example of the rate of evolution in
technology enhancements available today
only touches the surface. New materials
with exciting properties are being developed
every day and have the potential to perfonn
far beyond one's imagination.

It

Despite the "seven fat volumes" of
standard operating procedures, the Scout is
an excellent example of the application of
off-the-shelf technology and hardware being
combined to produce a system; the first
stage was taken from the the Navy's Polaris
missile; the second stage Castor was a
derivative of the of the Anny's Sergeant;
the third and fourth stages were versions of
the Navy's Vanguard. By using existing
technology and hardware, both time and

Even though technology breakthroughs
will continue to occur and provide greater
capabilities. getting this technology into
today's defense or space systems is not an
10
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Space Command (USSPACECOM) when it
was formed in 1985. In this capacity he
served as chief, space support division.

Likewise. in the future. using
streamlined launch and integration procedures, and employing COTS technology,
space assets which are timely, more
responsive to operational exigencies, and
cost-effective are within reach.

Among his accomplishments, Mr Watkins
was a member of the Space System
Architecture 2000 study, which identified
space requirementS through the year 2000,
he was the AFSPACECOM representative to
the Aerospace Forum which provided a
vision of the Air Force major commands in
the year 2005, with space fully integrated
across all mission areas. He developed the
concept for a GPS users conference and
chaired the first three meetings.
He
organized and chaired the first GPS
command and control working group. While
assigned to the USSPACECOM he
developed the concept for a command
master plan which would show the
relation.rhips between the many programs of
the future that would be assigned to
CINCSPACE. The master plan has been
developed and provides an in.rightful view
of the future. As an employee of SRS
Technologies, he was a key player in the
development of the USSPACECOM phase I
BMD Concept of Operation.r.
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